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The Long-Term Effects of Cross-Listing,
Investor Recognition, and Ownership
Structure on Valuation
Michael R. King
International Department, Bank of Canada
Dan Segal
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
We show that investor recognition and bonding associated with a U.S. cross-listing are
distinct effects using a sample of Canadian firms. In contrast to the post-listing decline
documented in the literature, we find that cross-listed firms with a single class of shares
enjoy a permanent increase in valuation if they attract and maintain investor recognition
over time. Valuations of firms that fail to widen their U.S. shareholder base return to pre-
listing levels within two years. Cross-listed firms with dual-class shares exhibit a permanent
increase in valuation regardless of the level of U.S. investor holdings, consistent with firm-
level bonding. (JEL G12, G15)
The literature on cross-listing documents a number of benefits to listing on a
foreign stock exchange—benefits that are now seen as the conventional wis-
dom (Karolyi, 2006). Foreign firms that cross-list in the United States have
higher valuations, a lower cost of capital, and increased liquidity. The literature
provides a number of explanations for the valuation premium. Two leading
hypotheses are the investor recognition hypothesis of Merton (1987) and the
bonding hypothesis of Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999). We test and try
to distinguish between these competing explanations in this paper.
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) at-
tribute part of the increase in a cross-listed firm’s valuation to the broadening
of its U.S. investor base and the greater visibility of the firm, as predicted by
Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis. Merton develops a capital
asset pricing model under incomplete information where an increase in the
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number of investors aware of a firm lowers the expected returns on the firm’s
stock, resulting in a contemporaneous increase in valuation. This theory pro-
vides an incentive for Foreign firms that are either neglected or have a low
number of investors have an incentive to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange
if this action would increase their overall shareholder base. Indeed, surveys of
managers confirm that one of the reasons behind their decision to cross-list is
to broaden their shareholder base by attracting U.S. investors (Mittoo, 1992;
Fanto and Karmel, 1997; and Bancel and Mittoo, 2001).
Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) suggest that a foreign firm from a
jurisdiction featuring potentially weaker investor protection can increase its
valuation by bonding itself to the U.S. securities regime through cross-listing.
The bonding hypothesis suggests that companies with poor protection of mi-
nority shareholders signal their desire to respect the rights of shareholders by
listing in a jurisdiction with higher scrutiny by reputational intermediaries,
tougher regulation, and better enforcement. Better investor protection through
greater monitoring of controlling shareholders is seen as one of the factors
that explain the increase in stock returns following cross-listing, as U.S. and
home-country investors are more willing to invest in a foreign firm that has
tied its hands in this way. Doidge (2004), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004),
and Reese and Weisbach (2002) find empirical results that support the bonding
hypothesis.
While the literature provides empirical support for both hypotheses, there
are two issues that have not yet been resolved. First, Merton’s (1987) theory
predicts a permanent increase in valuation post-cross-listing assuming that
investor recognition does not dissipate over time. The evidence in the literature,
however, documents a postlisting decline in valuations within a year of cross-
listing. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show positive abnormal returns during the
year prior to the actual listing followed by negative abnormal returns in the
years following a U.S. listing. Similarly, Mittoo (2003) finds that Canadian
cross-listed firms outperform the market by 30–40% in the year prior to listing,
but underperform the market by 13–30% over the three years subsequent to
listing.1 These empirical results do not support the prediction of permanent
gains from Merton’s model. One potential explanation for these findings is that
these studies failed to control for changes in the level of investor recognition
both cross-sectionally and over time.
Second, there is little evidence on the link between the investor recognition
hypothesis and the bonding hypothesis, as prior studies have examined these
effects in isolation. Specifically, there is not enough evidence to determine
whether the two effects can be distinguished from each other as both are
related to an improvement in the information environment of a firm. Hence,
the bonding effect may be indistinguishable or completely subsumed by the
1 Sarkissian and Schill (forthcoming) provide further country-level evidence of this pattern in an event study of
firms that were cross-listed as of 1998. Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2005) document a similar pattern in a
firm’s Tobin’s q ratio.
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investor recognition effect and vice versa. Bris, Cantale, and Nishiotis (2007) try
to disentangle the two effects using an event study of 21 dual-class firms that list
one of their share classes on the U.S. stock exchanges. They find that improved
liquidity and access to foreign investors are the most important effects, while
the effects of improved investor protection are economically small. Doidge
et al. (2006) provide additional evidence by showing that foreign firms with
concentrated ownership that cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange benefit more
than widely held firms in terms of increased valuations and analyst coverage.2
Nonetheless, the evidence in Bris, Cantale, and Nishiotis (2007) is based on
a very limited sample, while Doidge et al. (2006) is a cross-sectional study
that does not control for changing firm-level characteristics that may condition
the longer horizon effects. A large panel dataset covering a cross-section of
cross-listed firms over time may provide a new perspective on these hypotheses
and their relative importance.
Canadian firms provide a unique opportunity to examine the long-term ef-
fect of cross-listing on valuation and to disentangle these two hypotheses.
Canadian firms make up the single largest group of foreign firms listed on
U.S. stock exchanges, providing a large sample with considerable time-series
and cross-sectional variation in firm-level characteristics, while controlling for
country-level differences. In addition, Canada and the United States share the
same legal, regulatory, and market institutions. Canada is geographically close,
has the same English common-law legal system, and offers similar levels of
shareholder protection as the United States. Furthermore, a significant number
of Canadian firms (close to 20%) have dual-class shares.3 Dual-class shares al-
low the divergence of control and cash-flow rights, creating a more acute agency
conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2006) show how this ownership structure creates lower valuations for
U.S. firms, even though the level of investor protection in the United Statets is
considered to be among the highest in the world. Given the similarities between
Canada and the United States, we expect that bonding would have little if any
impact on the valuation of Canadian firms with a single class of shares as these
firms have no inherent conflict between controlling and minority shareholders.
Further, we expect that any valuation premium would be attributed primarily
to investor recognition. At the same time, the large sample of dual-class firms
allows us to examine whether the valuation premium from cross-listing for
these firms is attributed to a bonding effect, an investor recognition effect, or
both. Specifically, we test for a firm-level bonding effect by examining whether
the valuation premium of cross-listed dual-class firms with few or no U.S.
investors is positive and different from zero, after controlling for other firm
characteristics. The impact of investor recognition can then be measured by
2 Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide a recent summary of the literature on concentrated ownership.
3 Amoako-Adu and Smith (1995) and Attig (2005) document the widespread use of dual-class shares in Canada.
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examining the difference in valuation premium of cross-listed dual-class firms
with high and low investor recognition.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we confirm
cross-sectionally that the magnitude of the increase in valuation at the time
of cross-listing is conditional on the widening of the firm’s U.S. shareholder
base. Firms that fail to attract U.S. investors do not experience an increase in
valuation and are valued similarly to non-cross-listed firms. Second, we show
that increased valuations associated with cross-listing are permanent only for
firms that maintain a broader U.S. shareholder base as predicted by Merton’s
(1987) hypothesis. Third, we show that investor recognition and bonding are
separate effects. Canadian firms that use dual-class shares are valued at a
discount to widely held firms, suggesting that the agency conflicts between
minority and controlling shareholders are acute for these firms. In contrast to
the findings for other firms, cross-listed firms with dual-class shares exhibit
a permanent increase in valuation independently of the level of U.S. investor
holdings; dual-class firms with few or no U.S. investors experience a similar
increase in valuation as dual-class firms with high investor recognition. These
results suggest that better monitoring of controlling shareholders and a reduced
risk of expropriation of minority shareholders is the main effect explaining
the increase in valuation for cross-listed dual-class firms, consistent with the
firm-level bonding proposed by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004).4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops
the hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data and methodology, and presents
descriptive statistics of our sample. Section 3 presents the empirical results.
Section 4 concludes.
1. Hypothesis Development
The impact of cross-listing on a foreign stock exchange is a much-researched
phenomenon (Karolyi, 1998, 2006). While studies have generated a number
of explanations for the benefits of cross-listing, there is little consensus on
which effect dominates. The evidence in the literature suggests three main
drivers, among others: increased liquidity as the foreign firm’s shares become
more accessible to U.S. investors (the liquidity hypothesis), increased investor
recognition associated with a widening of the cross-listed firm’s shareholder
base and an improvement in its information environment (the investor recog-
nition hypothesis), and better investor protection (the bonding hypothesis). In
this paper, we focus on the investor recognition and bonding hypotheses, as
previous studies such as Mittoo (2003) rule out liquidity as an explanation of
longer term performance.5
4 We term this effect firm-level bonding to distinguish it from legal bonding, which depends on country-level
improvements in the legal regime governing these firms.
5 Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Mittoo (2003) provide comprehensive discussions of the liquidity hypothesis.
2396
The Long-Term Effects of Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, and Ownership Structure on Valuation
1.1 Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis
Merton (1987) modifies the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model to in-
clude a factor, the “shadow cost of information,” which proxies for incomplete
information about the securities available for investment. The assumption be-
hind the model is that some stocks are known to relatively few investors, and
investors in these “neglected” securities require a return premium for bearing
idiosyncratic risk. The model has two main implications. First, the value of a
security is positively associated with the number of investors who know about
the security. Second, the expected return on a security is decreasing in the num-
ber of investors who know about the security. In the setting of cross-listing, the
implication is that foreign firms have an incentive to cross-list on a U.S. stock
exchange if this action will increase their overall shareholder base, which in
turn will result in an increase in valuation.
Consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, Foerster and Karolyi
(1999) find that cross-listed firms experience close to a 30% increase in their
number of shareholders. The firms that widen their shareholder base the most
exhibit the greatest increase in stock price in response to the listing announce-
ment. Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) and Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003)
also show that cross-listed firms experience an increase in media visibility and
analyst following, both of which are associated with a decrease in the cost of
equity capital after the listing. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
H1: The valuation premium of cross-listed Canadian firms relative to non-
cross-listed Canadian firms is positively related to the level of investor
recognition.
Although the aforementioned studies examine the impact of investor recog-
nition on stock returns around the cross-listing event, they do not examine the
duration or longevity of the valuation effects associated with investor recog-
nition beyond a one-year horizon. While Merton’s (1987) general equilibrium
theory predicts a permanent increase in the valuation of cross-listed firms, sev-
eral studies provide evidence that the increase in valuation is transitory. Mittoo
(2003) finds that Canadian cross-listed firms outperform the market by 30–40%
in the year prior to listing, but underperform the market by 13–30% over the
three years subsequent to listing. Sarkissian and Schill (forthcoming) provide
further country-level evidence of a prelisting run-up and postlisting decline in
returns, while Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2005) show a similar pattern
in Tobin’s q ratio.6 These studies do not support, however, the prediction of
permanent gains from Merton’s model, potentially because they do not con-
trol for the level of investor recognition after cross-listing. Hence, our second
hypothesis focuses on the effect of investor recognition over time:
6 Rather than testing the investor recognition hypothesis, Sarkissian and Schill (forthcoming) focus on home bias
and examine the impact on residual returns of country-level variables, such as the size of exports, industry
structure, culture, and distance.
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H2: The valuation premium of cross-listed Canadian firms relative to
non-cross-listed Canadian firms in the years following cross-listing is
conditional on the level of investor recognition.
Merton’s (1987) model focuses specifically on the size of the firm’s investor
base under incomplete information relative to the total investor base for the com-
plete information case when all investors are aware of the security. One cannot
directly observe, however, how many potential investors are aware of each firm.
In this study, we use two related proxies for investor recognition—the number
of U.S. institutional investors holding the stock, and the proportional ownership
by U.S. institutional investors of the stock—both measured post-cross-listing.7
While these measures are imperfect proxies for investor recognition, it is rea-
sonable to assume that they are highly correlated with investors’ awareness of
the stock.
1.2 Firm-level bonding hypothesis
The investor recognition hypothesis suggests that all firms stand to benefit from
the increased visibility and broader investor base associated with cross-listing.
The evidence suggests, however, that ownership structure may qualify this pre-
diction. The literature on concentrated ownership focuses on two dimensions
of ownership structure: the presence and control stake of a blockholder and the
use of mechanisms that enhance control, such as dual-class shares. Given the
lack of reliable data on ownership stakes for the time period covered by this
study, we focus on firms with dual-class shares, defined as a firm that has two
or more classes of common shares with different voting rights.8 By separating
cash-flow rights from voting rights, the dual-class share structure allows con-
trolling shareholders to escape the wealth consequences of their own decisions.9
This separation weakens their alignment with minority shareholders and po-
tentially increases the risk of expropriation. Thus, the incentives to indulge in
wealth diversionary behavior or extract private benefits are higher in dual-class
firms compared to firms with a one-share-one-vote structure (DeAngelo and
DeAngelo, 1985; and Grossman and Hart, 1988).
The bonding hypothesis of Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) proposes
two channels by which a U.S. listing reduces the ability of controlling share-
holders to extract private benefits from a foreign firm, thereby increasing the
firm’s valuation (Benos and Weisbach, 2004; and Karolyi, 2006). Bonding
may occur either through the courts or through monitoring by reputational
7 While analyst coverage is an important proxy used in other studies, I/B/E/S data on analyst coverage of Canadian
firms is limited to only a small sample (see Leuz, 2003). For this reason, we do not test this variable in this
analysis.
8 Identifying controlling blockholders requires reading the annual filings and proxy statements of each firm, which
are not available prior to 1997. In a sensitivity analysis, we use a smaller number of firms and find that controlling
for concentrated ownership does not affect any of the results.
9 Nenova (2003) provides a rigorous analysis for measuring the private benefits of control.
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intermediaries, such as U.S. underwriters, auditors, credit-rating agencies, eq-
uity analysts, and stock exchanges. Coffee terms the first channel legal or
liability-based bonding, and the second channel reputational bonding.
Legal bonding refers to U.S. securities laws that allow minority shareholders
to pursue class action suits and derivative actions against foreign managers,
backed by the enforcement powers of the Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC). Licht (2001, 2003) and Siegel (2005) are critical of legal bonding, and
provide evidence that the SEC and minority shareholders have not effectively
enforced U.S. securities laws against foreign firms. Nevertheless, legal bonding
through the fear from litigation by U.S. authorities may still serve as a deterrent
of managers from expropriating the firm’s assets, thereby providing protection
of minority shareholders.
Reputational bonding refers to the activities of financial intermediaries who
monitor the foreign firm and improve the information environment, thereby
reducing the information asymmetry between controlling and minority share-
holders. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) provide theoretical support for the
reduction in information asymmetry. They argue that a U.S. listing increases
the quality and/or the quantity of information available to minority sharehold-
ers and reduces the extent to which controlling shareholders can engage in
expropriation. Listing on a U.S. exchange, however, increases the firm’s abil-
ity to take advantage of growth opportunities. Hence, controlling shareholders
have an incentive to cross-list if the benefits that accrue to them of exploit-
ing valuable growth opportunities exceed the costs of greater monitoring and
lower consumption of the private benefits of control. This firm-level bonding
hypothesis is supported by Doidge et al. (2006), who find that foreign firms
with a large controlling shareholder are less likely to cross-list on a U.S. stock
exchange. At the same time, firms with a large controlling shareholder that
decide to cross-list experience a greater increase in valuation and in analyst
coverage than the average cross-listed firm.
This firm-level bonding effect may be particularly important for firms where
controlling shareholders use dual-class shares to separate cash-flow rights from
control rights. Doidge (2004) finds that while both share classes benefit from
a U.S. listing, the minority shareholders benefit proportionately more as the
voting premium between share classes narrows. The reduced premium, he
argues, proxies for the greater protection offered to minority shareholders by a
U.S. listing.10 Doidge et al. (2006) note that firms with a separation of control
and cash-flow rights have lower valuations on average, but experience a greater
increase in valuation when they cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange than widely
held firms.
Investor recognition and firm-level bonding may be complementary effects
as both are related to an improvement in the information environment of a firm.
10 Doidge (2004) does not consider whether this effect is related to investor recognition, and does not look at the
valuation of these firms.
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In both cases, cross-listing on a U.S. exchange reduces the firm-specific risk
premium charged by outside investors, lowers the cost of capital, and increases
valuations. Whereas the investor recognition hypothesis focuses on the higher
risk premium charged to firms that are not widely known, firm-level bonding
focuses on the risk premium demanded by existing investors who have incom-
plete information about the actions of controlling shareholders. Cross-listing
increases the quantity and/or quality of information about the foreign firm,
reducing the shadow cost of incomplete information on one hand, and reduc-
ing the information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders
on the other. Given these complementary effects, the bonding effect may be
indistinguishable or completely subsumed by the investor recognition effect.
One way to distinguish between the two effects is to focus on a sample that
consists of two groups of firms: Canadian firms with a single share class that
have a similar alignment of shareholder interests as U.S firms, and Canadian
firms with dual-class shares that have more acute agency conflicts between
controlling and minority shareholders. Given that the first group faces the same
principal-agent problems as U.S. firms, we expect the valuation premium of
cross-listing to be primarily related to investor recognition. Conversely, the
valuation premium of firms with agency conflicts is expected to be related both
to investor recognition and to firm-level bonding effects, but the latter effect
can be identified for firms that fail to widen their U.S. shareholder base. In
these cases, the effect of firm-level bonding should dominate. Hence, our third
hypothesis consists of three parts:
H3A: Cross-listed firms with dual-class shares trade at a premium relative
to non-cross-listed firms with dual-class shares.
H3B: Investor recognition has a greater impact relative to firm-level bond-
ing on the valuation premium of cross-listed Canadian firms with a single
class of shares.
H3C: Firm-level bonding has a similar impact to the investor recognition
effect on the valuation premium of cross-listed firms with dual-class shares.
2. Data
We study Canadian firms over the eighteen-year period from 1988 to 2005.11
We collect annual financial statement data from Canadian and U.S. Compustat
databases. Stock prices are collected from the CRSP and the TSX-Canadian
Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) monthly databases. U.S. institu-
tional ownership data are obtained from the 13F regulatory filings reported on
11 We exclude firms that are traded on the OTC Bulletin Board or the NASD Pink Sheets.
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the CDA/Spectrum database.12,13 We identify cross-listed firms and the listing
date using past issues of the TSX Review, trading data in CRSP, news searches
on Factiva, and data from U.S. stock exchanges.
The full sample consists of all Canadian firms that meet the following criteria:
nonmissing total assets (DATA6 on Compustat), sales (DATA12), book value
of equity (DATA60), and income before extraordinary items (DATA18). We
exclude financial firms and small firms with a market capitalization less than
C$10 million to make our sample comparable with other studies. Firms that
delist due to a takeover, bankruptcy, or other reason are present in our sample
until the year of delisting. These restrictions result in a final sample size of
7,070 firm-year observations (of which 1,890 are of cross-listed firms) from
1,265 firms (of which 287 are cross-listed). Manufacturing and service firms
make up 43% of the sample, followed by natural resource firms at 28%, high
technology firms at 22%, and transportation and utility stocks at 7%.
We use Tobin’s q as the valuation measure.14 We compute Tobin’s q as the
ratio of market value of equity plus book value of debt scaled by total assets
as of the end of the fiscal year. We use the following control variables in all
regressions: firm size, future growth opportunities, leverage, and profitability.
Firm size is computed as the log of total assets. We proxy future growth
opportunities using past sales growth computed as the two-year average growth
rate in sales.15 Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets.
Profitability is measured by the return on assets (ROA), calculated as earnings
before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. We winsorize these variables at
the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers.
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics of the control variables used
in this study. We compare non-cross-listed firms with cross-listed firms, and test
whether the difference in the mean (median) is statistically significant using
a parametric t-test (nonparametric sign-rank test). Consistent with previous
studies, cross-listed firms have a significantly higher Tobin’s q ratio; the mean
(median) ratio for the cross-listed firms is 1.787 (1.301), as compared with
the mean (median) for the non-cross-listed firms of 1.526 (1.187). Cross-listed
firms are much larger than non-cross-listed firms, with total assets at the mean
(median) that are five (four) times larger, and mean (median) market value
of equity that is eight (four) times larger. Both types of firms have similar
12 The 13F data cover primarily companies that are listed on a U.S. exchange. Because there is no regulatory
requirement for Canadian institutional investors to report their holdings or for U.S. institutional investors to
report their foreign holdings, we do not have similar data for non-cross-listed Canadian firms. It is possible that
U.S. institutions hold some of the firms in our sample that are not cross-listed or held shares in cross-listed
companies before cross-listing, and hence our measure of investor recognition can be noisy. Nonetheless, we do
not have data on institutional ownership prior to cross-listing, and therefore must rely on the 13F data.
13 Cross-listed firms for which there was no information in CDA/Spectrum are treated as having no U.S. institutional
investors.
14 Doidge et al. (2006); Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004); Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2005); and Lang, Lins,
and Miller (2003) use Tobin’s q to assess the impact of cross-listing.
15 If the two-year growth rate is not available, one-year growth in sales is used.
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mean sales growth rates, although the median sales growth rate of cross-listed
firms is higher than the non-cross-listed firms. Non-cross-listed firms have a
statistically higher ROA at both the mean and the median than cross-listed
firms. Leverage is comparable across samples. Finally, cross-listed firms have
much higher foreign sales, consistent with Pagano, Ro¨ell, and Zechner (2002).
Panel B of Table 1 compares the same firm characteristics across single-class
and dual-class firms. Consistent with existing studies, we find that firms with
dual-class shares on average have a lower Tobin’s q ratio, higher assets, lower
market value of equity, and higher leverage.16 Firms with dual-class shares
have lower sales growth but higher profitability, implying that the discount rate
applied to their earnings must be higher to generate lower valuations. Finally,
dual-class firms have statistically lower foreign sales at the mean but not at the
median than one-share-one-vote firms.
Panel C of Table 1 provides summary statistics on U.S. institutional hold-
ings of the cross-listed firms in our sample. We use two measures of investor
recognition: the number of U.S. institutional investors that report a holding in
a stock for a given year, and the percentage of outstanding shares held by U.S.
institutional investors. The mean (median) number of institutional investors is
36 (12). The mean percentage holdings are 16.3% while the median is 8.9%.
Figure 1 shows how the mean value for these variables increases each year
following cross-listing, suggesting that cross-listing does widen the average
foreign firm’s U.S. investor base.
3. Results
In this section, we discuss the potential endogeneity among the valuation mea-
sure, the decision to cross-list, and the investment decision of institutional
investors. We use a three-stage least-squares approach, where we estimate the
probability of cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange, predict the level of hold-
ings of U.S. investors based on firm characteristics, and use these predicted
values in regressions on Tobin’s q.
3.1 Predicting the decision to cross-list
A significant methodological issue facing cross-listing studies is the possible
endogeneity between valuation and the decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock
exchange. While theory may suggest the direction of causation runs from cross-
listing to higher firm valuations, an alternative explanation is that firms with
higher valuations list on a U.S. stock exchange following a period of strong
performance. A failure to deal with endogeneity may lead to a biased coefficient
on the cross-listing variable generating misleading results. To address this po-
tential endogeneity, we follow Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) and estimate
16 For studies of firms with dual-class shares outside North America, see Claessens et al. (2002); Cronqvist and
Nilsson (2003); Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001); Lemmon and Lins (2003); and Lins (2003).
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Figure 1
Change in U.S. investor holdings around cross-listing
a treatment-effects model for the decision to cross-list, where a firm is coded
1 if cross-listed and 0 otherwise.17 The first-stage equation is estimated as a
17 An alternative approach is to use matching methods, whereby observations of cross-listed firms for a given
year are matched with non-cross-listed firms based on observable characteristics, such as firm size and industry
membership. We discuss this approach in Section 3.6.
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probit, where the output is the predicted probability of being cross-listed in a
given year. We then use the predicted probability of cross-listing in subsequent
regressions that estimate the impact of cross-listing on a firm’s valuation.
We use the following variables to estimate the probability of cross-listing:
firm size, foreign sales, sales growth, ownership structure, industry mem-
bership, profitability, and leverage. Pagano, Ro¨ell, and Zechner (2002) find
that the proportion of foreign sales and firm size are the two most important
variables explaining the decision of European firms to list abroad. Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) show that firms with growth opportunities are more
likely to list abroad, with U.S. investors assigning the highest value to growth
opportunities. Mittoo (2003) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) suggest that
industry membership is an important characteristic affecting the decision to
cross-list. We therefore include industry dummies identifying firms in four
broad categories: high-tech firms, natural resources, utilities and transporta-
tion, and manufacturing and service industries.
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) also predict that ownership structure
affects the decision to cross-list. Controlling shareholders have an incentive
to cross-list if the benefits that accrue to them of exploiting valuable growth
opportunities exceed the costs of greater monitoring and lower consumption of
the private benefits of control following cross-listing. These monitoring costs
will be highest for blockholders that use dual-class shares to maintain control,
as the private benefits of control are higher. We identify these firms using
a dummy variable, DUALCLASS, coded 1 if the firm has dual-class shares
and 0 otherwise. Because the size of unexploited growth opportunities must
be large enough to offset the higher costs of monitoring, we also construct a
dummy variable, HIGROW, that takes a value of 1 for firms with higher than the
median sales growth, and 0 otherwise. We interact HIGROW with DUALCLASS
to identify those dual-class firms that have the greatest incentive to cross-list.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of the probit model of the decision
to cross-list. The pseudo-R squared is close to 40%, and a chi-squared test
confirms the statistical significance of the overall specification. Consistent with
prior research, larger firms and firms with high foreign sales are more likely
to cross-list. We find a negative relation between cross-listing and leverage
and ROA. The coefficient on sales growth and HIGROW are positive but not
statistically significant; the coefficient on DUALCLASS is negative but not
significant. However, the interaction of DUALCLASS with HIGROW is positive,
implying that firms where the benefits of exploiting growth opportunities appear
large are more likely to bear the costs of greater monitoring associated with
a U.S. listing, consistent with the predictions of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz
(2004).18
18 Following Pagano, Ro¨ell, and Zechner (2002), we check the robustness of our results by estimating a Cox
proportional hazard model. This model uses duration analysis to investigate which company characteristics are
associated with a foreign listing. The estimated model shows that firm size, foreign sales, and HIGROW are
positively associated and leverage is negatively associated with cross-listing.
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Table 2
Prediction equations
Variable
Panel A: Predicting the decision to cross-list
Constant −2.639∗∗∗
Log of assets 0.299∗∗∗
Foreign sales 2.992∗∗∗
Sales growth 0.015
HIGROW dummy 0.057
Leverage −1.026∗∗∗
ROA −1.525∗∗∗
DUALCLASS −0.248
DUALCLASS∗HIGROW 0.458∗∗∗
Industry dummies Yes
N 7, 070
Pseudo R2 0.396
Chi-squared 360.825
Percentage holdings
Variable Number of U.S. investors of U.S. investors
Panel B: Investment decision of U.S. institutional investors
Constant 1.128∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
Log of assets 0.387∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
Sales growth 0.003 0.006
Leverage −0.696∗∗∗ −0.027
ROA −0.081 −0.004
TSE 300 0.184∗∗ 0.020∗∗
Share turnover 0.278∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
Loss dummy −0.023 −0.006
R&D intensity −0.015 −0.009
Dividend yield −0.214 −0.082
DUALCLASS −0.715∗∗∗ 0.018
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
N 1, 890 1, 890
Overall R2 0.412 0.359
Chi-squared 1478.078 1499.519
Panel A reports results of a probit that estimates the probability of cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange over
the period from 1988 to 2005. The sample is cross-listed and non-cross-listed Canadian firms. Log of assets is
total assets in millions converted to U.S. dollars using the fiscal year-end exchange rate. Foreign sales is the
percentage of total sales outside of Canada. Sales growth is the two-year average growth rate in sales. If two-year
data are not available, one-year growth in sales is used. HIGROW is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for firms
with past sales growth that is above the median for the sample, and 0 otherwise. Leverage is total debt/total
assets. ROA is earning before interest and taxes/total assets. DUALCLASS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms with
two or more share classes with different voting rights. Industry dummies are included but not shown. Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Panel B reports results of random-effects regressions of the number of U.S. investors or the percentage holdings
of U.S. investors in cross-listed Canadian firms from 1988 to 2005. TSE 300 is a dummy set equal to 1 if the firm
is a member of the TSE 300 index, and 0 otherwise. Share turnover is annual trading volume/shares outstanding.
Loss is a dummy set equal to 1 for firms with negative earnings before extraordinary items. R&D intensity is
research & development expense/sales. Dividend yield is the yield on common shares. The other variables are
defined above. Industry and year dummies are included but not shown. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
3.2 Endogeneity in the investment decision of U.S. institutional investors
The relationship between investor recognition and the valuation of cross-listed
firms may also suffer from an endogeneity problem. For example, Ammer
et al. (2005), Bushee (1998), and Ferreira and Matos (2006) find that U.S.
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institutional investors tend to hold firms that have higher valuations. It is not
clear, therefore, whether the widening in a cross-listed firm’s shareholder base
causes the increase in Tobin’s q around cross-listing, or U.S. investors prefer
foreign firms that have high valuations. To address this endogeneity, we instru-
ment for the number (or percentage holdings) of U.S. investors and use the
predicted values in subsequent regressions on Tobin’s q.
We predict the holdings of U.S. investors based on firm-level characteristics.
Ammer et al. (2005), Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2005), Edison and Warnock
(2004), and Ferreira and Matos (2006) find that U.S. investors hold more stock
in foreign firms with the following characteristics: large size, higher liquidity
of trading, higher profitability, higher growth opportunities, lower financial
leverage, higher visibility through membership in a major stock index, and
lower dividend payout.19 We therefore include controls for firm size, prof-
itability, growth opportunities, and leverage. We proxy for liquidity using share
turnover, measured as total shares traded in a given year divided by shares
outstanding. To control for higher visibility and membership in an index, we
use a dummy variable to identify Canadian firms whose shares are included
in the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 composite index (TSE 300) for a given
year.20 We measure dividend payout as dividends paid to common sharehold-
ers divided by book value of common equity. Ammer et al. (2005), Edison
and Warnock (2004), Ferreira and Matos (2006), and Leuz, Lins, and Warnock
(2005) find that U.S. institutional investors avoid foreign firms controlled by
a large blockholder, particularly where owners use dual-class shares to sepa-
rate cash-flow rights from control rights. We therefore control for ownership
structure by including the DUALCLASS dummy. Finally, we include factors
identified by Bushee (1998), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2002), and Frieder and
Subrahmanyam (2005) that explain the domestic holdings of U.S. institutional
investors: a LOSS dummy set equal to 1 if the firm reports negative earnings
and 0 otherwise, and research and development (R&D) intensity, measured as
R&D expense divided by total sales.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the regression results for the sample of cross-
listed firms. We present two specifications: one where the dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of the number of U.S. institutional investors (INS_NUM)
and the other where the dependent variable is the percentage ownership of U.S.
institutional investors (INS_HOL). Column 1 reports the results of regressions
on INS_NUM, where the fit of the regression is above 40%. Consistent with the
literature, we find that INS_NUM is positively associated with firm size, mem-
bership in the TSE 300 index, and share turnover, and negatively associated
19 These studies also identify country-level characteristics affecting U.S. holdings of foreign stocks that are con-
trolled for in our study, namely, close geographical proximity, high number of U.S. listings, credible accounting
information, high disclosure requirements, and low transaction costs on the home exchange.
20 The TSE 300 index identifies the largest Canadian firms by market capitalization in a given year. The TSE 300
index was replaced by the S&P/TSX composite index in May 2002, at which time the number of firms was
reduced to remove smaller, more illiquid firms.
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Table 3
Cross-sectional impact of investor recognition on Tobin’s q
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Constant 3.228∗∗∗ 3.310∗∗∗ 3.303∗∗∗ 3.321∗∗∗ 3.302∗∗∗
Log of assets −0.290∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗
Sales growth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
Leverage −0.214∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗ −0.205∗∗ −0.194∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗
ROA 0.103 0.078 0.083 0.068 0.069
DUALCLASS −0.210∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗
Predicted XLIST 0.200∗∗ 0.012 0.109 −0.054 0.029
INS_NUM 0.150∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
INUMHI 0.342∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
INUMLO −0.003 0.035
XDC 0.474∗∗ 0.412∗∗
INS_NUM∗DUALCLASS −0.112∗∗
INUMHI∗DUALCLASS −0.343∗∗
INUMLO∗DUALCLASS −0.208
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7, 070 7, 070 7, 070 7, 070 7, 070
Overall R2 0.169 0.204 0.185 0.206 0.184
Chi-squared 872.335 958.815 914.449 966.016 921.991
This table reports results of three-stage least-squares regressions that estimate the impact of cross-listing on
Tobin’s q, controlling for the decision to cross-list and investor recognition. DUALCLASS is a dummy equal to 1
for firms with two or more share classes with different voting rights. Predicted XLIST is the predicted probability
of cross-listing and INS_NUM is the predicted number of U.S. investors from Table 2. XDC is the interaction
of DUALCLASS and predicted XLIST. INUMHI (INUMLO) is a dummy equal to 1 for cross-listed firms in the
upper (lower) half of the predicted number of U.S. investors in a given year. All other variables are defined in
Tables 1 and 2. Industry and year dummies are included but not shown. The regressions are estimated using
panel data with firm random effects. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
with leverage. INS_NUM is negatively associated with DUALCLASS, confirm-
ing that U.S. institutional investors are less willing to invest in firms where the
risk of wealth diversionary behavior is greater. Other characteristics such as
past sales growth, profitability, and dividend policy are not statistically signifi-
cant. Column 2 reports the results of regressions on INS_HOL, where the fit of
the regression is 36%. Firm size, TSE 300 membership, and share turnover are
positively correlated with percentage holdings, but leverage and DUALCLASS
are not statistically significant. We use the predicted values of INS_NUM and
INS_HOL from these specifications in the regressions on Tobin’s q below as
proxies for investor recognition.
3.3 Cross-sectional impact of investor recognition on Tobin’s q
Table 3 examines the cross-sectional impact of investor recognition on Tobin’s
q estimated using panel regressions with firm-level random effects.21 The stan-
dard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. Column 1 of Table 3 presents
the base regression of the effect of cross-listing on Tobin’s q. Consistent with
21 The panel regressions throughout the paper are estimated using firm random effects because a number of our
variables of interest are either time invariant, such as our industry dummies, or exhibit few changes over time,
such as the dummy for firms with dual-class shares. A fixed-effects regression would drop these time-invariant
dummies, as their effect could not be distinguished from the firm-specific error term that is also time invariant.
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the literature, Tobin’s q is positively related to sales growth and negatively
related to firm size and leverage. The coefficient on ROA is not significant.
The coefficient on DUALCLASS is negative and significant, indicating that
firms with dual-class shares are valued at a discount relative to firms with a
one-share-one-vote structure. This result confirms the findings of other studies
that document a negative relationship between firm value and the separation of
cash-flow rights from control rights (Claessens et al. 2002; Lemmon and Lins,
2003; Lins, 2003; and Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). The coefficient on the
predicted probability of cross-listing (XLIST) is positive (0.200) and statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level, indicating that cross-listed firms enjoy a higher
valuation than non-cross-listed firms on average. This finding is consistent with
the ubiquitous evidence in the cross-listing literature (Karolyi, 1998, 2006).
Column 2 of Table 3 repeats the regression from column 1 but adds the
predicted number of U.S. investors (INS_NUM) to the independent variables.
The control variables have the same magnitudes, signs, and statistical signif-
icance. However, the coefficient on XLIST is no longer significant, while the
coefficient on INS_NUM (0.150) is positive and significant. This coefficient im-
plies that the cross-listed firms that have the average number of U.S. investors
have Tobin’s q ratios that are higher by 0.538, or a 16% premium relative to
non-cross-listed firms. The change in statistical significance of XLIST suggests
that controlling for the increase in investor recognition explains much of the
unexplained valuation premium. Put differently, it appears that the premium in
valuation of cross-listed companies is attributed primarily to increased investor
recognition. Cross-listed firms that do not succeed in widening their U.S. in-
vestor base are not valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed companies.
The fit of the regression also increases from 16.9 to 20.4%, suggesting that the
INS_NUM variable explains considerable cross-sectional variation.
We examine threshold effects of the impact of investor recognition on val-
uation by separating the number of investors into two dummy variables: one
identifying cross-listed firms that have more than the median predicted number
of U.S. investors in a given year (INUMHI), and one identifying cross-listed
firms with less than the median predicted number of U.S. investors (INUMLO).
Column 3 of Table 3 shows that the coefficient on INUMHI (0.342) is posi-
tive and significant while the coefficient on INUMLO (−0.003) is not different
from zero. In addition, the coefficient on XLIST remains not significant. These
findings further suggest that the valuation premium to cross-listed companies
accrues primarily to firms with increased investor recognition. Cross-listed
firms that fail to widen their U.S. shareholder base exhibit similar valuations to
non-cross-listed firms.
Column 4 of Table 3 examines the cross-sectional impact of investor recog-
nition controlling for ownership structure by including two interaction terms:
one between DUALCLASS and XLIST, termed XDC, and one between DU-
ALCLASS and INS_NUM. As before, the coefficient on XLIST is not signifi-
cant, the coefficient on INS_NUM (0.163) is positive and significant, and the
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coefficient on DUALCLASS (−0.261) is negative and significant. The coeffi-
cient on XDC (0.474) is positive and significant and the sum of XDC and XLIST
(0.420) is positive and significant. These two findings suggest that cross-listed
firms with dual-class shares trade at a premium relative to dual-class firms that
are not cross-listed. This valuation premium is consistent with the firm-level
bonding hypothesis of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) that suggests part
of the benefit associated with cross-listing may reflect better monitoring of
controlling shareholders. Further, a chi-squared test does not reject the hypoth-
esis that the linear combination of the coefficients DUALCLASS + XLIST +
XDC (0.159) is equal to zero, implying that firms with dual-class shares are no
longer valued at a discount relative to firms with one-share-one-vote structures
following cross-listing.
The interaction of DUALCLASS with INS_NUM (−0.112) is negative and
significant, implying that the benefit of increased investor recognition is lower
for dual-class firms relative to other cross-listed firms. This finding is consistent
with investors assigning a higher risk premium to dual-class firms, consistent
with Claessens et al. (2002), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), Lins (2003), and
Lemmon and Lins (2003). In addition, the sum of INS_NUM and its interaction
with DUALCLASS (0.051), which measures the overall impact of investor
recognition on the valuation of dual-class firms, is not significantly different
from zero. This finding suggests that the valuation premium for the average
dual-class firm is not related to the degree of investor recognition.
Finally, column 5 of Table 3 shows the regression results of Tobin’s q on
INUMHI and INUMLO and their interaction with the DUALCLASS dummy.
As before, XLIST is not significant and XDC (0.412) is positive and signifi-
cant, and the coefficients and statistical significance on INUMHI (0.397) and
INUMLO (0.035) are relatively unchanged. The interaction of INUMHI with
DUALCLASS (−0.343) is negative and significant, confirming that the valua-
tion benefit of greater investor recognition is lower for cross-listed dual-class
firms. The coefficient on the interaction variable of DUALCLASS and INUMLO
(−0.208) is negative but not significant. In addition, the linear combinations
of the interaction coefficients with either INUMHI or INUMLO are not statis-
tically different from zero, confirming that the increase in valuation associated
with cross-listing for dual-class firms does not vary with the level of investor
recognition.
Overall, the findings in Table 3 suggest that the increase in valuation as-
sociated with cross-listing may be explained by the two competing hypothe-
ses: the investor recognition hypothesis and the firm-level bonding hypoth-
esis. Cross-listed firms with a one-share-one-vote structure exhibit higher
valuations relative to non-cross-listed firms, and the valuation premium is
increasing in the degree of investor recognition. Further, it appears that
the entire valuation premium from cross-listing is explained by investor
recognition after controlling for firm-level characteristics. Firms with dual-
class shares, however, exhibit a valuation premium following cross-listing
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Figure 2
Change in Tobin’s q around cross-listing
independently of investor recognition, consistent with a firm-level bonding ef-
fect due to greater monitoring of controlling shareholders. Furthermore, when
there is a potential impact of both firm-level bonding and investor recognition
for firms with agency problems (i.e., dual-class firms), we find that the firm-
level bonding effect dominates; in fact, the valuation premium for cross-listed
dual-class firms does not vary with the degree of investor recognition.
3.4 Times-series impact of investor recognition on Tobin’s q
The regressions in Table 3 show that the cross-sectional valuation premium
of cross-listing depends in part on investor recognition. These regressions,
however, do not address whether the effects of cross-listing on a firm’s valuation
are permanent or transitory. In this section we examine how the valuation
premium due to investor recognition varies over time.
To motivate this analysis, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the mean and
median Tobin’s q ratio over the five years before and after cross-listing for 148
Canadian firms that first cross-listed on a U.S. exchange between 1988 and
2005. Both the mean and median valuation peak in the year prior to cross-
listing (XLIST year = −1), then decline monotonically in subsequent years.
While an announcement effect of cross-listing may explain part of the run-up
close to the event, the outperformance appears to begin several years prior to
cross-listing, suggesting that firms decide to cross-list following a period of
strong performance.
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Table 4
Time series impact of investor recognition on Tobin’s q
Sample All firms DUALCLASS only
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Constant 3.236∗∗∗ 3.326∗∗∗ 3.323∗∗∗ 2.952∗∗∗ 2.952∗∗∗
Log of assets −0.294∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗
Sales growth 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.025
Leverage −0.213∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗ −0.159∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
ROA 0.080 0.068 0.059 −0.181 −0.162
DUALCLASS −0.264∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗
Predicted XLIST 0.001 −0.029 −0.074 0.610∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗
XDC 0.191 0.253 0.245
CYR −2 0.310∗∗ 0.281∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.218 0.131
CYR −1 0.722∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
CYR 0 0.199∗∗ −0.187∗∗ 0.109
CYR 1 0.379∗∗∗ −0.017 0.215∗
CYR 2 0.204∗∗ −0.218∗∗ 0.157
CYR 3+ 0.305∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗ 0.125
INS_NUM 0.224∗∗∗
INS_NUM in CYR 0 0.207∗∗∗ 0.034
INS_NUM in CYR 1 0.189∗∗∗ 0.010
INS_NUM in CYR 2 0.132∗∗∗ −0.025
INS_NUM in CYR 3+ 0.195∗∗∗ −0.004
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7, 070 7, 070 7, 070 1, 328 1, 328
Overall R2 0.190 0.207 0.201 0.160 0.166
Chi-squared 936 1, 025 1, 022 179 189
This table reports results of three-stage least-squares regressions that estimate the impact of cross-listing on
Tobin’s q over time, controlling for the decision to cross-list and investor recognition. The sample consists of
cross-listed and non-cross-listed Canadian firms from 1988 to 2005 in columns 1–3, and dual-class firms only
in columns 4 and 5. CYR −2 to CYR 3+ are dummy variables based on the year relative to cross-listing, where
CYR 0 is the year of listing on a U.S. stock exchange. CYR 3+ takes the value of 1 if the year post-cross-listing
is 3 and so on. The variables INS_NUM in CYR i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) are coded as the predicted value of INS_NUM in
CYR i post-cross-listing and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 3. Industry and year dummies
are included but not shown. The regressions are estimated using panel data with firm random effects. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 4 presents regressions quantifying the valuation premium over time.
Column 1 shows the regression results of Tobin’s q on the control variables
and a dummy variable for each year relative to the year of cross-listing.22
For example, CYR 0 is the actual year of cross-listing, CYR 1 is the first year
following cross-listing, and so on.23 The regression includes the CYR dummies
from two years before cross-listing, and so on. Thus, the valuation in year 3 or
earlier prior to cross-listing is captured by the intercept. The control variables
have the same sign, magnitude, and statistical significance as in Table 3. The
coefficients on the CYR dummies are positive and significant, suggesting a
prelisting run-up that starts at CYR −2 (0.310), peaks in CYR −1 (0.722),
and then declines post-cross-listing. The positive and significant coefficients
on CYR 1 through CYR 3 imply a higher valuation on average relative to
22 We code these dummy variables based on the actual year of cross-listing, as the predicted values of XLIST only
provide a probability of being listed in a given year and cannot be used to generate these dummies.
23 To conserve space, we group years 3 and higher under one dummy variable (CYR 3+).
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three or more years prior to cross-listing.24 The coefficient on CYR 3 (0.305)
implies that there is a permanent gain in valuation of 9.4% for cross-listed firms
relative to their valuations three years prior to cross-listing. This conclusion is
reinforced by the observations that CYR 3 (which includes the third year and on
post-cross-listing) identifies the average effect for almost three-quarters of the
observations of cross-listed firms in our sample. The XLIST variable identifying
the predicted probability of cross-listing is not significant as the explanatory
power is picked up by the CYR dummies. While the interaction with dual-class
(XDC) is not significant, the linear combination of DUALCLASS, XLIST, and
XDC is not significantly different from zero, confirming the valuation premium
to cross-listed firms with dual-class shares. The sum of DUALCLASS, XLIST,
and XDC is not significantly different from zero throughout the following
regressions.
In column 2 of Table 4, we examine how increased investor recognition
affects this pattern over time. We include the predicted number of U.S. in-
vestors, INS_NUM, and find that it is positive and significant (0.224), confirm-
ing the results in Table 3. Interestingly, the CYR dummies change signs, and
are negative and significant in CYR 0, CYR 2, and CYR 3+. These negative
coefficients must be interpreted carefully, as they imply that firms that do not
widen their shareholder base (where INS_NUM = 0) experience a post-listing
decline in valuation consistent with the pattern found in Foerster and Karolyi
(1999), Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2005), Mittoo (2003), and Sarkissian
and Schill (forthcoming). In contrast, firms that succeed in widening their
shareholder base experience permanent gains. For example, a cross-listed firm
that attracts the mean number of U.S. investors has a premium valuation in CYR
3+ of 18.2% on average, consistent with the predictions of Merton’s (1987)
investor recognition hypothesis.25 This premium is similar in magnitude to the
premium reported in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004).
In column 3 of Table 4, we replace the CYR dummies and INS_NUM with
threshold variables that measure the degree of investor recognition in each
year after cross-listing. Specifically, these variables are coded as the predicted
value of INS_NUM in the ith year (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) after cross-listing and zero
otherwise. Consistent with the view that widening the U.S. shareholder base
leads to increases in valuation, the coefficients are positive and significant in
each year, suggesting higher investor recognition is associated with higher val-
uations postlisting. A similar pattern emerges when we replace the number of
investors in each year after cross-listing with the INUMHI and INUMLO dum-
mies (results not shown). Firms that have more than the median predicted
number of U.S. investors have positive and significant valuation premium
24 Note that the overall premium in each year post-cross-listing is computed as the sum of the CYR dummy and
XLIST, which are all positive and significant.
25 The mean predicted number of U.S. investors is 36. The average premium on Tobin’s q in CYR 3+ is therefore
ln(36)∗0.224−0.199 = 0.604, which implies an 18.2% premium over the constant in this regression of 3.326.
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in each year post-cross-listing, whereas cross-listed firms that fail to attract
higher than the median predicted number of U.S. investors do not trade at a
premium.
Column 4 of Table 4 replicates the analysis in column 1 using only dual-
class firms. The coefficient on XLIST (0.610) is positive and significant, and
the CYR 0 through CYR 3 dummies are all positive. The sums of the CYR
dummies and XLIST are all positive and significant, indicating that cross-listed
dual-class firms enjoy permanent valuation gains relative to non-cross-listed
dual-class firms. Finally, column 5 replicates the analysis in column 3 using
only dual-class firms. The XLIST variable is positive and significant (0.676),
implying that Tobin’s q ratios of cross-listed dual-class firms are 20.1% higher
on average without taking into account the increase in the U.S. investor base.
The pre-listing run-up for dual-class firms is also positive and significant.
Unlike the case in column 3, however, all of the coefficients on the predicted
value of INS_NUM in the years after cross-listing are not significant, implying
that there is no systematic variation in valuations for dual-class firms based
on levels of investor recognition. This finding confirms the results in Table 3
that firms with dual-class shares get a valuation premium that does not vary
based on the size of their U.S. investor base. Thus, the results imply that for
these firms it is the impact of firm-level bonding following cross-listing and
not investor recognition that is associated with higher valuations.
Overall, the results suggest that the permanent effect of cross-listing on a
firm’s valuation is conditional on firm characteristics, investor recognition, and
ownership structure. First, firms with a one-share-one-vote structure appear to
cross-list on U.S. exchanges following a prelisting run-up in their Tobin’s q
ratios. Second, consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, only firms
that succeed in widening their U.S. investor base significantly get a perma-
nent increase in their valuations relative to non-cross-listed firms. Canadian
firms that attract few or no U.S. investors experience a postlisting decline in
Tobin’s q and do not exhibit higher valuations relative to non-cross-listed com-
panies. Third, the impact of cross-listing on firms with dual-class shares is
different. These firms begin with lower valuations, consistent with investors
charging a higher risk premium to offset the greater risk of expropriation by
controlling shareholders. The decision to cross-list leads to a significant in-
crease in valuation and this premium does not vary with the level of investor
recognition. Further, the increase in valuation appears to be permanent, consis-
tent with a firm-level bonding effect.
3.5 Robustness using only firms that cross-list between 1988 and 2005
The analysis thus far has addressed endogeneity in both the decision to
cross-list and the foreign holdings of U.S. investors by predicting these
variables and including them in the main regressions. In this section, we
check the robustness of our results in Tables 3 and 4 by addressing the en-
dogeneity issues differently. Rather than comparing cross-listed firms with
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Table 5
Regressions using only firms that cross-listed between 1988 and 2005
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Constant 3.596∗∗∗ 3.720∗∗∗ 3.921∗∗∗ 3.443∗∗∗ 3.542∗∗∗
Log of assets −0.340∗∗∗ −0.353∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.357∗∗∗
Sales growth 0.219∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
Leverage −0.697∗∗∗ −0.719∗∗∗ −0.846∗∗∗ −0.966∗∗∗ −0.745∗∗∗
ROA −0.031 −0.067 −0.016 0.07 −0.06
DUALCLASS −0.274∗ −0.523∗∗ −0.520∗∗ −0.516∗∗ −0.493∗∗
CYR −2 0.096 0.088 0.093 0.182 0.122
CYR −1 0.484∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
XLIST dummy −0.282∗∗ −0.449∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗
LOGINS_NUM 0.264∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
XDC 0.811∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
INS_NUM∗DUALCLASS −0.244∗∗∗
INUMHI 0.281∗∗∗
INUMLO −0.163
INUMHI∗DUALCLASS −0.041
INUMLO∗DUALCLASS 0.441∗∗
CYR 0 0.058
CYR 1 0.237
CYR 2 0.078
CYR 3 0.264∗
CYR 0∗DUALCLASS 0.044
CYR 1∗DUALCLASS 0.055
CYR 2∗DUALCLASS 0.317
CYR 3∗DUALCLASS 0.210
INS_NUM in CYR 0 0.305∗∗∗
INS_NUM in CYR 1 0.305∗∗∗
INS_NUM in CYR 2 0.256∗∗∗
INS_NUM in CYR 3 0.356∗∗∗
INS_NUM in CYR 0∗DUALCLASS −0.349∗∗∗
INS_NUM in CYR 1∗DUALCLASS −0.347∗∗∗
INS_NUM in CYR 2∗DUALCLASS −0.235∗∗∗
INS_NUM in CYR 3∗DUALCLASS −0.240∗∗∗
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1, 352 1, 352 1, 352 1, 352 1, 352
Overall R2 0.318 0.330 0.289 0.27 0.340
Chi-squared 362 383 320 297 400
This table reports results of random-effects regressions that estimate the impact of cross-listing on Tobin’s q.
The sample is restricted to the observations of firms that first cross-listed from 1988 to 2005. XLIST is dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange and 0 otherwise. LOGINS_NUM is the log
of the actual number of U.S. institutional investors. All other variables are defined in Table 4. Industry and year
dummies are included but not shown. The regressions are estimated using panel data with firm random effects.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
non-cross-listed firms, we compare the cross-listed firms against their own
history by looking at their valuation before and after cross-listing.
We identify all firms in our sample that cross-listed for the first time between
1988 and 2005. Firms that were cross-listed prior to 1988 are not included as
we do not observe their valuation prior to cross-listing. We exclude firms that
cross-list at the time of an initial public offering or following a spin-off for the
same reason. These restrictions reduce our sample to 1,352 observations for
206 firms, where the median firm is in the sample for six years.
Table 5 repeats the main results from Tables 3 and 4, but with two key
differences. First, instead of using the predicted probability of cross-listing
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from Table 2, we use a dummy variable (XLIST) set to 1 if the firm is actually
cross-listed and 0 otherwise. Second, we use the log of actual number of U.S.
investors holding the stock as opposed to the predicted values.26 We confirm
that the results below are robust when using the predicted number of investors
instead of the actual values.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows regressions of Tobin’s q on the control variables,
the dummy variable DUALCLASS, dummies for CYR −2 and CYR −1, the
XLIST dummy, and the log of the actual number of U.S. investors, INS_NUM.
The controls have the same sign and significance as before, with Tobin’s q
negatively related to firm size and leverage, and positively related to growth
opportunities. The coefficient on DUALCLASS (−0.274) is negative and sig-
nificant, corroborating our finding that firms with dual-class shares are valued
at a discount. The coefficient on the dummy CYR −1 (0.484) is positive and
significant, consistent with a prelisting run-up. The XLIST dummy (−0.282)
is negative and significant, consistent with the postlisting decline shown in
Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2005), Mittoo
(2003), and Sarkissian and Schill (forthcoming). The coefficient on INS_NUM
(0.264) is positive and significant, implying that cross-listed firms with the
mean number of U.S. investors have a Tobin’s q ratio that is 8% higher on
average post-cross-listing.
Column 2 of Table 5 considers how the effect of cross-listing on firm valua-
tions varies based on ownership structure. We include the interaction of XLIST
with DUALCLASS, XDC, and the interaction of DUALCLASS with INS_NUM.
As in column 1, XLIST (−0.449) is negative and significant and INS_NUM
(0.323) is positive and significant. The interaction term XDC (0.811) is positive
and significant, implying that dual-class firms that cross-list exhibit signifi-
cantly higher valuations than non-cross-listed dual-class firms. Also, the linear
combination of the coefficients DUALCLASS, XLIST, and XDC is not signif-
icantly different from zero, implying that cross-listed firms with dual-class
shares are valued similarly to one-share-one-vote firms prior to cross-listing.
The interaction of INS_NUM with DUALCLASS (−0.244) is negative and sig-
nificant, and the sum of the interaction term and INS_NUM is not significantly
different from zero, implying that the valuation of cross-listed firms with dual-
class shares does not vary based on the level of investor recognition, confirming
our findings above.
Next we examine the impact of investor recognition and firm-level bonding
on the valuation of cross-listed firms in column 3 of Table 5. We classify the
cross-listed firms into two groups based on the level of investor recognition.
We code INUMHI (INUMLO) as 1 if the firm has more (less) than the median
26 The actual and predicted numbers of U.S. investors have a correlation of 86% with similar means (36 for actual
INS_NUM versus 35 for predicted INS_NUM), but with greater dispersion and negative skewness in the actual
INS_NUM as there are more observations with no U.S. investors.
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number of institutional investors and 0 otherwise.27 We also interact INUMHI
and INUMLO with the DUALCLASS dummy to examine the effect of investor
recognition on the valuation of dual-class firms. The coefficient on INUMHI
(0.281) is positive and significant while the coefficient on INUMLO (−0.163)
is not significant. These findings confirm that only cross-listed firms that are
successful in attracting investor recognition get a valuation premium post cross-
listing. We examine the impact of investor recognition on dual-class firms by
computing the sum of INUMHI (INUMLO) and the interaction with DUAL-
CLASS. The sum of INUMHI and its interaction with DUALCLASS (0.240)
is positive and significant and the sum of INUMLO and its interaction with
DUALCLASS (0.278) is also positive and significant. Further, the two sums are
not statistically different from each other. These findings provide additional ev-
idence that dual-class firms are valued at a premium post cross-listing relative
to dual-class shares that are not cross-listed, and that the valuation premium
does not vary with the level of investor recognition.
Column 4 of Table 5 shows the analysis of the valuation premium over time
independently of investor recognition. As before, CYR i, (i = 0, 1, 2) is a
dummy set to 1 in the ith year of cross-listing and 0 otherwise. CYR 3 is a
dummy with 1 for all years after year 2 and 0 otherwise. The results show that
the coefficients on the CYR dummies are positive; yet, only CYR 3 (0.264) is
significant at the 10% level. Thus, given that most of the observations in our
sample are cross-listed more than two years, there appears to be a permanent
valuation premium to cross-listed firms. The interaction of the CYR dummies
with DUALCLASS gives the marginal premium to dual-class firms, and the
sums of the CYR dummies with their interactions give the overall premium to
dual-class firms. Although the interaction terms are not significantly different
from zero, the sum of CYR 3 and its interaction with DUALCLASS is positive
and significant (at less than 5%), indicating that dual-class firms exhibit a
permanent valuation premium following cross-listing.
Finally, column 5 of Table 5 considers the effect of investor recognition
on the time-series property of the valuation premium. We regress Tobin’s q
on the control variables, XLIST, XDC, and the level of investor recognition in
each of the years post-cross-listing. In addition, we interact the latter variables
with the DUALCLASS dummy. As before, the coefficient on XLIST (−0.366)
is negative and significant whereas the coefficient on XDC (0.852) is positive
and significant. In addition, the sum of XDC and XLIST (0.486) is positive and
significant, indicating that cross-listed dual-class firms have higher valuations
post cross-listing. The coefficients on the level of investor recognition in each of
the years post-cross-listing are all positive and significant, indicating a positive
association between the level of investor recognition and the valuation premium
post-cross-listing. The coefficients on the interactions of the levels of investor
27 We do not include the XLIST dummy in the regression because the sum of INUMHI and INUMLO is 1 for
cross-listed firms and 0 otherwise.
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recognition with the DUALCLASS dummy are all negative and significant, and
the sum of the coefficients on these interactions and the coefficients on the level
of investor recognition are not significantly different from zero. These results
again confirm that the higher valuations for dual-class firms do not vary based
on the level of investor recognition.
3.6 Sensitivity analyses
We examine the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we replicate all
the regressions using the predicted value of percentage holdings of U.S. insti-
tutional investors in Tables 3 and 4, and the actual values in Table 5. The results
are very similar to those reported. Second, we examine whether our results are
robust to the way we control for endogeneity in the decision to cross-list by
using a matched sample. Specifically, the sample is constructed using one-to-
one matching (without replacement) of cross-listed firms with non-cross-listed
firms based on year, firm size measured by total assets, and industry member-
ship using the first two digits of the North-American Industry Classification
System codes. The results are similar with one important exception; the impact
of investor recognition on the valuation premium wears off after two years,
controlling for firm characteristics. There are two possible explanations for
the divergence in the results: (1) the matched sample is much smaller—2,802
firm-year observations as opposed to 7,070—providing less power to these
tests, particularly as the number of observations post-cross-listing declines; (2)
the matching process does not control for other important variables that are
related to the decision to cross-list, such as foreign sales, growth opportunities,
and ownership structure. Third, we examine whether the results change in the
matched sample analysis when we control for the presence of a controlling
shareholder at the 20% threshold and a single class of shares. We find that
controlling for concentrated ownership does not affect any of the results.
4. Conclusion
This study examines the cross-sectional and time-varying impact of investor
recognition and firm-level bonding on the valuation of Canadian firms cross-
listed on a U.S. exchange. Canada provides a unique setting to disentangle
these competing hypotheses, as it features similar levels of investor protection
and disclosure as the United States, but offers a larger cross-section of dual-
class firms—both cross-listed on a U.S. exchange and listed exclusively in the
home market—where the incentives of controlling and minority shareholders
diverge. We show that increased valuations associated with greater investor
recognition following a U.S. listing are conditional on the widening of the
U.S. shareholder base. Consistent with the findings in Baker, Nofsinger, and
Weaver (2002) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999), we find that the valuation of
cross-listed Canadian firms increases with both the number and proportional
holdings of U.S. institutional investors. We show cross-sectionally, however,
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that not all firms exhibit higher valuations following a U.S. listing. The firms
that benefit most are the ones that are the most successful in broadening their
U.S. investor base. Canadian firms that cross-list and attract few or no U.S.
investors are valued no differently than non-cross-listed firms after controlling
for firm characteristics.
Using panel regressions, we examine the impact of cross-listing on valuation
over time. In contrast to earlier studies, we find that the effects of greater
investor recognition are permanent, not transitory. Canadian firms that attract
and maintain a high level of U.S. institutional investor holdings experience a
permanent increase in valuation. Canadian firms that fail to sustain a wider
U.S. investor base experience a postlisting decline, with valuations similar to
prelisting levels within two years of cross-listing. This result is robust when we
examine the valuations of cross-listed firms before and after their U.S. listing.
We also provide evidence that investor recognition and firm-level bonding
are distinct but related effects. We disentangle these effects by focusing on the
impact of cross-listing on the valuation of firms that use dual-class shares to
separate cash-flow rights from control rights. We find that Canadian firms with
dual-class shares benefit relatively more from cross-listing. We also show that
this premium from cross-listing does not depend on whether these firms succeed
or not in expanding their U.S. shareholder base. In particular, dual-class firms
that attract few or no U.S. investors exhibit higher valuations post-cross-listing,
consistent with the firm-level bonding effect proposed by Doidge, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2004). This result is consistent with a U.S. listing improving the
monitoring of controlling shareholders and reducing the risk of expropria-
tion of minority shareholders for firms where the agency conflicts are most
acute.
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